Introduction

1. Features of the NEP policy

Curtailment of the NEP

3. Results of the NEP

4. Significance of the NEP

Conclusion

List of used literature

Introduction

NEP - economic policy Soviet Russia, which changed the policy of "war communism".

NEP - This abbreviation stands for "new economic policy". The NEP has become a whole era, although all its stages fit into one decade: the new economic policy was adopted by the Tenth Congress of the RCP (b) in 1921.

The main purpose of the proclamation of the NEP was the restoration of the national economy, destroyed by two fierce wars (World War I and Civil War). By the end of 1920 hostilities had basically ended in the European part of the country. In Siberia and the Far East they continued until 1922. What were the results?

The hopes that Soviet Russia would not be alone for long, and that after the victory of the revolutions in the West we would build socialism together with other more developed countries, mutually helping each other, did not come true. Since 1920, the revolutionary wave in Europe began to subside rather quickly. Revolutions in Germany, Austria, Hungary were suppressed. Hopes for European help proved untenable. It was also not necessary to count on loans and other assistance, since the Soviet government canceled all old debts in 1917, and after the end of the civil war found itself in diplomatic isolation. Consequently, now one could rely only on one's own strength, which radically changed the situation. It is no coincidence that, speaking at the X Congress of the RCP (b), V.I. Lenin noted: “The socialist revolution in such a country can have final success under two conditions. First, with the support of its socialist revolution in one or more advanced countries. As you know, for this condition we have done a lot compared to the previous ones, but far from enough to make it a reality.

Another condition is an agreement between the proletariat exercising its dictatorship or holding state power in its hands and the majority of the peasant population.

What can we observe inside the country? The economic situation deteriorated rapidly. Since hostilities were going on almost throughout the country, most of the enterprises naturally suffered during these battles. In many areas, the economic infrastructure was simply destroyed.

Of course, the idea of ​​the NEP did not appear ready-made overnight. It was a long, painfully difficult search for forms and types of economic ties that would combine possible concessions to the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois sections of the population, and at the same time allow us not to lose sight of the main final task - building a socialist, and then a communist economy with all their inherent features. Therefore, the actual development of the main economic measures that make up the NEP continues from 1921, when it began to be introduced, and up to 1925-27, when we began the transition to forced development.

The purpose of the work is to consider the reasons for the curtailment of the NEP.

1.Features of the NEP policy

The state of Soviet Russia in 1921 was terrifying. The young country lay in ruins.

Immediately after the Great October Revolution, at the end of 1917, the US government terminated relations with Russia, and in 1918 England and France ceased. Soon (in October 1919), the Supreme Council of the military alliance of the leading capitalist states - the Entente - announced the termination of all economic ties with Soviet Russia. An attempt at an economic blockade was accompanied by military intervention. The blockade was lifted only in January 1920. Then, on the part of Western states, an attempt was made to organize the so-called gold blockade: they refused to accept Soviet gold as a means of payment in international settlements.

The ideology of the Bolsheviks was heading towards socialism; in order to implement this project, it was necessary first to create a material and technical one for it.

The policy of war communism, carried out until 1921, aggravated the situation - the peasants began to express their mood against the new government, which was embodied for them mainly in the form of food detachments, food requisitions. It was time to restore the economy. In March 1921, the 10th Congress of the RCP(b) decided to replace the surplus appropriation tax with a tax in kind, which was half the surplus appropriation tax, and was established as a share deduction from the output, based on the crop, the number of eaters, the availability of livestock, etc. The tax covered up to 20% of agricultural products. Later in March 1922 it was reduced to 10%. The tax had a clearly defined class character: for the poor and middle peasants, the percentage of deductions was reduced.

It was also important that the surplus product remained the property of the peasant and could be used at his personal discretion. Allowed free trade in food in the market. In production, they gradually began to move from equalizing ration wages to pay in cash. At the same time, piecework payment was introduced according to the quantity and quality of labor.

One of the manifestations of the NEP in industry was that private enterprise was allowed again:

) It was allowed to open private enterprises with up to 20 workers.

) Leasing of small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises was allowed.

) The creation of mixed joint-stock companies with the participation of state and private capital was allowed.

) Concessions were allowed to attract foreign capital.

) The development of various forms of cooperation was encouraged.

Already these first measures meant not only the admission, but also a sharp expansion of commodity-money relations, which during the time of war communism were brought to naught. Their development was impossible without the restoration of a stable monetary and financial and banking systems.

Market relations were again legalized. The development of new commodity-money relations led to the restoration of the all-Russian market. During the NEP, the country's banking system was formed. Direct and indirect taxes are introduced, which become the main source of state revenues (excises, income and agricultural taxes, service fees, etc.). All this was the prerequisite for the emergence of the NEP.

Due to the fact that the policy of the NEP in Russia was seriously hampered by inflation and the instability of monetary circulation, a monetary reform. By the end of 1922, a stable currency unit- chervonets, which was provided with gold or other valuables.

An acute shortage of capital led to the beginning of active administrative intervention in the economy. First, the administrative influence on the industrial sector increased (Regulations on State Industrial Trusts), and soon it spread to the agricultural sector.

As a result, the NEP by 1928, despite frequent crises provoked by the incompetence of new leaders, led to a noticeable economic growth and a certain improvement in the situation in the country. The national income increased, the financial situation of citizens (workers, peasants, as well as employees) became more stable.

d. attempts to curtail it begin. The reason for the curtailment of the NEP is the strengthening of contradictions between politics and economics. The private sector and the resurgent agriculture sought to get into politics to support their interests. This contributed to the intra-party struggle. And the new members of the Bolshevik Party, the peasants and workers who went bankrupt during the NEP, were not satisfied with the new economic policy.

The transition to the NEP certainly helped in the formation and strengthening of the power of the Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia, but was curtailed on October 11, 1931, although already in October 1928 the implementation of the first five-year plan began.

2.Curtailment of the NEP

So, by 1925-1926. economic recovery is over. The country was entering a new period of reconstruction.

In the second half of the 1920s. the first prerequisites for the curtailment of the NEP appeared. Syndicates began to be liquidated in industry, and the private capital. The creation of economic people's commissariats was the beginning of the establishment of a centralized system of economic management.

Soviet history determines the reasons for the curtailment of the NEP by a complex of economic factors. But a more careful analysis of the contradictions of the New Economic Policy suggests that, first of all, the reasons for the curtailment of the NEP were the contradictions between the natural functioning of the economy and the political course. So, since the mid-1920s. measures are being actively taken to limit, and soon to completely oust the private producer. The political course is the support of cooperative farms and the displacement of the capital of the "private owner". new economic policy russia

Since 1928, the economy finally switched to a planned system: the development of the national economy began to operate.

The new course meant that the era of the NEP was fading into the past.

Legally, the NEP was completed on October 11, 1931, with<#"justify">The main reasons for the curtailment of the NEP were:

) non-fulfillment of export obligations (disruption of grain procurement), which reduced foreign exchange earnings and, accordingly, led to a reduction in industrial production and capital construction;

) much faster growth in demand in the domestic market compared to supply (an increase in the number of workers in industry and construction; a 10% reduction in prices in 1927 with a simultaneous increase in the nominal wages of workers increased effective demand);

) the policy of active crowding out of private capital since 1926:

· increase in tariffs for transportation of private goods;

· suspension of state lending to private enterprises;

· the introduction in 1927 of a tax on excess profits;

· the prohibition of leasing state-owned enterprises to private individuals and the renewal of old contracts;

· a decrease in the number of foreign concessions (before 1930, most of the concessions were liquidated; in 1931, private industry was also liquidated);

4) nationalization of distribution: in 1929, a transition was made to a card supply system; in February 1930, commodity exchanges and fairs were liquidated.

The USSR chose the second of two alternatives:

) the low rates of development of the entire economy on the basis of the NEP and the progressive lag behind the leading capitalist countries;

) the rejection of the market, a return to administrative methods, the concentration of available resources and the accelerated development of the main link in the economy - big industry. The NEP policy was a forced tactical step taken under the pressure of circumstances, and not a strategic line.

The curtailment of the NEP at the end of the 1920s was due to the internal economic contradictions of this policy and the contradictory processes that it caused in society.

Among them:

Firstly, the restoration of industry proceeded on the former technical base and was not accompanied by the reconstruction of old enterprises to the proper extent. Life, however, did not stand still, and, consequently, the country more and more lagged behind the developed countries in technical and economic terms.

Secondly, the industrialization that began in Russia at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. was interrupted by World War I and subsequent events. The country was still agricultural. Only 10% of the population was employed in industry, and it provided only 20-25% of the national income. The majority of people lived in countryside. The suspended industrialization had to be carried through to the end.

Thirdly, the Bolsheviks have always proceeded from the fact that the victory of socialism is connected in the economy, first of all, with the development of modern large-scale industry with an appropriate socio-economic infrastructure, with the presence of modern agriculture based on machine labor. Numerous statements by the classics of Marxism are known that the victory of the new system is ultimately ensured by a higher organization of production and corresponding labor productivity. Consequently, from a purely doctrinal standpoint, the need for industrialization was also beyond doubt.

Fourthly, the main reason for the curtailment and then liquidation of the NEP was that for the Bolsheviks the immediate threat of losing political power had practically disappeared. Stalin consolidated his power in the party, and further retreat from socialism lost its meaning in the country. Therefore, by the end of the 1920s. NEP was completely eliminated, and Stalin became virtually the sole ruler.

Results of the NEP

The implementation of the new economic policy achieved its intended goal: the ruined economy was restored. Taking into account the fact that highly qualified personnel were either oppressed or forced to leave the country because of their social origin, the emergence of a new generation of economists, managers and production workers can also be considered a significant success of the new government.

Impressive successes in the restoration and development of the national economy in the era of the NEP were achieved in the context of fundamentally new social relations. This makes the country's economic recovery environment truly unique.

In the era of the NEP, key positions in industry belonged to state trusts, in the credit and financial sphere - primarily to state banks, in agriculture, small peasant farms were the basis.

Industrial syndicates were curtailed, private capital was squeezed out of them by administrative methods. A rigid centralized system of economic management was created - people's commissariats.

The intensive development of industry required more and more resources, but it was not possible to attract private capital. To speed up industry, everything that the peasantry produces was required, but the tax in kind was only 30% of the output.

In 1927-1928, a grain procurement crisis arose, and the introduction of a rationing system was required. The problem was solved by returning to the methods of "war communism" - through the forcible seizure of grain.

From October 1928, the government began to implement the first "five-year plan", a course was taken to accelerate industrialization and collectivization.

By that time, the New Economic Policy had virtually ceased to exist, but the legal end of the NEP came on October 11, 1931.

4. Significance of the NEP

The New Economic Policy existed in our country for only a few years - from 1921 to 1928. In the history of the USSR, NEP is a short stage in development preceding the "great achievements of socialism" - industrialization and collectivization.

But the abolition of the state monopoly created the ground for the free movement of products - this is a partial restoration of trade, and hence capitalist relations.

Paradoxically, from the height of history, the NEP seems rather a short step back from the socio-economic development programmed by the revolution, and therefore, without denying its achievements, one cannot but say that other measures could lead to the same results.

And the uniqueness of the era of the new economic policy lies primarily in its impact on culture.

As mentioned above, after the Great October Revolution, Russia lost most of the intellectual elite of society. The general cultural and spiritual level of the population fell sharply.

The new era puts forward new heroes - among the Nepmen who rose to the highest social levels, the lion's share is made up of wealthy private merchants, former shopkeepers and handicraftsmen, who were absolutely not touched by the romance of revolutionary trends.

To understand classical art, these "heroes of the new time" did not have enough education, and yet they became trendsetters. In accordance with this, cabarets and restaurants became the main entertainment of the NEP. However, one can say that this was a pan-European trend of those years, but it is in Soviet Russia, sandwiched between the reluctantly fading war communism and the looming dark era of repression, that this makes a special impression.

The era of the NEP is over, but the trace of that time is forever preserved in the history of a great country.

Conclusion

The New Economic Policy (NEP) was carried out in the USSR in the 1920s. It included a number of measures incompatible with the communist doctrine of the party, but was necessary to restore the country's economy, which suffered huge losses during the First World War and the Civil War. However, in the mid-1920s, the time came to abandon the NEP.

By that time, the development of the NEP had become increasingly controversial. A stratum of "private traders" - entrepreneurs - was actively formed in the country, market mechanisms and hired labor were used. But according to the political course, representatives of the bourgeois estates were out of the question. Thus, the reasons for the curtailment of the NEP were not only economic, but also political in nature. The Soviet government could not, even in the ideological sense, allow representatives of capitalism to power, and the capitalist elements in the economy could not develop further without political support.

In addition, the country's leadership from the very beginning considered the new economic policy as a forced, temporary measure, giving the country the necessary opportunities for the transition to socialism.

Therefore, in the second half of the 1920s, the liquidation of the NEP began to be gradually carried out.

List of used literature:

1. Batemsky A.M. New Economic Policy (NEP): History and Modernity. M., 1998

Vinogradov S.V. NEP: the experience of creating a mixed economy. M., 1996

Yablonskikh E.K. History of the Russian economy (lecture notes), MSTU Stankin 2004

Gimpelson E.G. The political system and the NEP: the inadequacy of reforms // Domestic History. 1993. No. 3

Golotik S.I., Danilin A.B., Evseeva V.N., Karpenko S.V. Soviet Russia in the 1920s: NEP, Bolshevik Power and Society. // New historical bulletin. №2 2000

indicating the topic right now to find out about the possibility of obtaining a consultation.

How capitalism was temporarily introduced in Soviet Russia

Ninety-five years ago, on March 21, 1921, in pursuance of the decisions of the X Congress of the RCP (b), the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of the RSFSR adopted the Decree "On the replacement of food and raw materials allocation with a tax in kind."

Recall that earlier the peasants were forced to give up to 70% of the produced product to the state, but now they had to give only about 30%. With the abolition of the surplus, in fact, it is necessary to count the beginning of the "New Economic Policy" (NEP), which was a series of reforms aimed at transforming mobilization war communism into market state capitalism.

As a result of the reforms, the peasants received the right to choose the form of land use: they could rent out land and hire workers. There was a decentralization of industrial management, enterprises were transferred to cost accounting. Individuals were allowed to open their own factories or rent them. Enterprises with up to 20 employees were nationalized. Foreign capital began to be attracted to the country, a law on concessions was adopted, in accordance with which joint-stock (foreign and mixed) enterprises began to be created. During the monetary reform, the ruble strengthened, which was facilitated by the issuance of the Soviet chervonets, equal to ten gold rubles.

Necessity or mistake?

Since the NEP meant the rejection of war communism, it is necessary to clarify what this very “communism” was and what it led to. In Soviet times, it was customary to consider it a kind of system of forced measures. Say, the Civil War was blazing in the country, and it was necessary to pursue a policy of tough mobilization of all resources. Sometimes such an excuse can be found today. However, the leaders of the Bolshevik Party themselves argued quite the opposite. Thus, at the 9th Party Congress (March-April 1920), Lenin said that the leadership system that had developed under war communism should also be applied to "peaceful tasks economic construction"Why do we need an" iron system ". And in 1921, already during the period of the NEP, Lenin admitted: “We expected ... by direct orders of the proletarian state to establish state production and state distribution of products in a communist way in a small-peasant country. Life has shown our mistake” (“On the 4th Anniversary of the October Revolution”). As you can see, Lenin himself considered war communism a mistake, and not some kind of necessity.

At the IX Congress of the RCP(b) (March - April 1920), a bet was made on the final eradication of market relations. The food dictatorship intensified, almost all basic foodstuffs, as well as some types of industrial raw materials, fell into the scope of apportionment.

It is characteristic that the tightening continued after the defeat of P.N. Wrangel, when the direct threat to Soviet power from the Whites had already been eliminated. At the end of 1920 - beginning of 1921, measures were taken to curtail the commodity-money system, which practically meant the abolition of money. The urban population was "exempted" from paying for services for the supply of food and consumer goods, the use of transport, fuel, medicines and housing. Instead of wages, distribution in kind was now introduced. The well-known historian S. Semanov wrote: “In the country as a whole, natural distributions accounted for the predominant share in the earnings of a worker: in 1919 - 73.3%, and in 1920 - already 92.6% ... Unhappy Russia returned to natural exchange.

They no longer traded in the markets, but “exchanged”: bread - for vodka, nails - for potatoes, a frock coat - for canvas, an awl - for soap, and what's the use of the fact that baths have become free?

In order to take a steam bath, it was necessary to obtain an “order” in the corresponding office ... workers at enterprises also tried, where they could, to pay “in kind”. At the rubber factory "Triangle" - a couple or two galoshes, at weaving factories - several arshins of fabric, etc. And at shipbuilding, metallurgical and military plants - what to give there? And the factory management looked through their fingers at how hard workers sharpened lighters on machine tools or dragged tools from the back rooms to change all this at the flea market for half a loaf of sour bread - you need to eat something. ("Kronstadt rebellion").

In addition, the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) nationalized the remnants of small enterprises. A powerful tightening of the surplus appraisal was planned. In December 1920, it was decided to supplement it with a new layout - seed and sowing. For this purpose, they even began to create special sowing committees. As a result of all this “communist construction”, a transport and food crisis began in the country. Russia was engulfed in the fire of numerous peasant uprisings. The Tambov one is considered the most famous of them, but serious resistance was also shown in many other regions. 100 thousand people fought in the rebel detachments of Western Siberia. Here the number of rebels even exceeded the number of Red Army soldiers. But there was also the Volga "Red Army of Truth" by A. Sapozhkov (25 thousand fighters), there were large rebel detachments in the Kuban, in Karelia, etc. This is what the "forced" policy of war communism brought the country to. escortcity.ch geneve escort The delegates of the 10th Congress were forced to travel from Siberia to Moscow with battles - railway communication was interrupted for several weeks.

Finally, the army rose up, an anti-Bolshevik rebellion broke out in Kronstadt - under red banners and with the slogan: "Soviets without communists!".

Obviously, at a certain stage of the Civil War, the Bolsheviks were tempted to use wartime mobilization levers in order to move on to the full-scale construction of the foundations of communism. Of course, in part, war communism was really caused by necessity, but very soon this need began to be perceived as an opportunity to implement some large-scale transformations.

Criticism of the NEP

The leadership realized the fallacy of the previous course, however, the “mass” of the communists had already managed to imbue the spirit of “war communism”. She was too accustomed to the harsh methods of "communist construction." And for the vast majority, the sharp change in course caused a real shock. In 1922, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee G.E. Zinoviev admitted that the introduction of the NEP caused almost complete misunderstanding. It resulted in a massive outflow from the RCP (b). In a number of counties in 1921 - early 1922, approximately 10% of its members left the party.

And then it was decided to carry out a large-scale "cleansing of the party ranks." “The purge of the party in 1921 was unprecedented in its results in the entire history of Bolshevism,” writes N.N. Maslov. – As a result of the purges, 159,355 people, or 24.1% of its membership, were expelled from the party; including 83.7% of those expelled from the party were "passive", that is, people who were members of the RCP (b), but did not take any part in party life. The rest were expelled from the party for abusing their position (8.7%), for performing religious rites (3.9%), and as hostile elements "infiltrating the ranks of the party with counter-revolutionary aims" (3.7%). About 3% of the Communists voluntarily left the ranks of the party without waiting for verification. (“RKP (b) - VKP (b) during the years of the NEP (1921–1929) // “Political parties of Russia: history and modernity”).

They started talking about the "economic Brest" of Bolshevism, and fuel was added to the fire of the party protest by N.I. Ustryalov, who effectively used this metaphor. But they also spoke positively about Brest, many believed that there was a temporary retreat - as in 1918, for several months. So, the employees of the People's Commissariat of Food at first almost did not see the difference between the surplus appraisal and the tax in kind. They expected that in autumn the country would return to a food dictatorship.

Mass dissatisfaction with the NEP forced the Central Committee to convene an emergency All-Russian Party Conference in May 1921. At it, Lenin convinced the delegates of the need for new relations, explaining the policy of the leadership. But many party members were irreconcilable, they saw in what was happening a betrayal of the bureaucracy, a logical consequence of the "Soviet" bureaucracy that had developed in the "military-communist" era.

Thus, the "workers' opposition" (A.G. Shlyapnikov, G.I. Myasnikov, S.P. Medvedev and others) actively opposed the NEP. They used a mocking decoding of the NEP abbreviation - "new exploitation of the proletariat."

In their opinion, the economic reforms led to a "bourgeois degeneration" (which, by the way, Ustryalov, a member of the Smeno-Vekhites, really hoped for). Here is an example of anti-NEP "workers'" criticism: "The free market cannot possibly fit into the model of the Soviet State. Supporters of the NEP at first spoke of the presence of some market freedoms, as a temporary concession, as some retreat before a big leap forward, but now it is argued that the Sov. the economy is unthinkable without it. I believe that the emerging class of NEPmen and kulaks is a threat to the power of the Bolsheviks. (S.P. Medvedev).

But there were also much more radical currents operating underground: “The year 1921 gave birth to several small Bolshevik Kronstadts,” writes M. Magid. - In Siberia and the Urals, where the traditions of partisanism were still alive, opponents of the bureaucracy began to create secret workers' unions. In the spring, the Chekists uncovered an underground organization of local communist workers in the Anzhero-Sudzhensky mines. It set as its goal the physical destruction of party officials, as well as specialists (state economic workers), who, even under Kolchak, had proven themselves to be obvious counter-revolutionaries, and then received warm places in state institutions. The core of this organization, numbering 150 people, was a group of old party members: a people's judge with party experience since 1905, the chairman of the mine cell - in the party since 1912, a member of the Soviet executive committee, etc. The organization, which consisted mainly of former anti-Kolchak partisans, was divided into cells. The latter kept a record of the persons to be destroyed during the action scheduled for May 1. In August of the same year, another report of the Cheka repeats that the most acute form of party opposition to the NEP are groups of party activists in Siberia. There the opposition took on the character of "positively dangerous" and "red banditry" arose. Now, at the Kuznetsk mines, a conspiratorial network of communist workers has been uncovered, which has set as its goal the extermination of responsible workers. Another similar organization was found somewhere in Eastern Siberia. The traditions of “red banditry” were also strong in the Donbass. From the closed report of the secretary of the Donetsk provincial committee Kviring for July 1922, it follows that the hostile attitude of the workers towards the specialists reaches outright terror. So, for example, an engineer was blown up in the Dolzhansky district and a foreman was murdered by two communists. ("The Workers' Opposition and the Workers' Insurrection").

Much was said about the danger of “capitalist restoration” on the left flank, where in the mid-1920s a “new opposition” (G.E. Zinoviev, L.B. Kamenev) and a “Trotsky-Zinoviev anti-party bloc” would arise. One of its leaders will be the chairman of the Financial Committee of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) E.A. Preobrazhensky, who already in December 1921 raised the alarm about the development of "farmer-kulak" farms. And in March 1922, this unusually vigilant comrade presented his theses to the Central Committee, in which he tried to give a thorough analysis of what was happening in the country. The conclusion was drawn as follows: “The process of smoothing out class contradictions in the countryside has stopped ... The process of differentiation has resumed with renewed vigor, and it manifests itself most of all where the restoration of agriculture is most successful and where the area cultivated by the plow is increasing ... In conditions of extreme decline peasant economy as a whole and the general impoverishment of the countryside, the growth of the rural bourgeoisie continues.

Preobrazhensky did not confine himself to one statement and presented his own "anti-crisis" program. He proposed to "develop state farms, support and expand proletarian agriculture on the plots given to factories, encourage the development of agricultural collectives and involve them in the orbit of a planned economy as the main form of transforming a peasant economy into a socialist one."

But the most interesting thing is that, along with all these "ultra-left" proposals, Preobrazhensky called for help in ... the capitalist West. In his opinion, foreign capital had to be widely poured into the country in order to create "large agricultural factories."

Sweet pieces for abroad

It is not surprising that with such love for foreign capital, Preobrazhensky in 1924 became deputy chairman of the Main Concession Committee (GKK) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. A year later, L.D. became the chairman of this committee. Trotsky, closely associated with the countries of the West. It was under him that the extraordinary strengthening of this organization takes place, although the concessions themselves were allowed at the very beginning of the NEP.

Under Trotsky, the GKK included such prominent leaders as Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov, Plenipotentiary A.A. Ioffe, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR G.L. Pyatakov, Secretary of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) A.I. Dogadov, the largest theorist and propagandist, member of the Central Committee A.I. Stetsky, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade L.B. Krasin and others. A representative assembly, you can't say anything. (It is significant that Krasin put forward a project to create large trusts for the extraction of oil and coal with the participation of foreign capital. He believed that it was necessary to provide parts of the shares of these trusts to the owners of nationalized enterprises. And in general, in his opinion, foreigners should have been actively involved in the management of trusts ).

In the GKK, deals were made with foreigners and a lot fell to the functionaries themselves. A.V. Boldyrev writes: “When people talk about the NEP, “Nepmen” or “Nepachi” usually come to mind - these characters stood out brightly with their ostentatious, but vulgar luxury against the backdrop of the devastation and poverty of the “war communism” era. However, a small freedom of entrepreneurship and the emergence of a small stratum of private entrepreneurs who took out hidden gold coins from caches and put them into circulation are only part of what was happening in the country. By orders of magnitude big money was spinning in concessions. It's like an entrepreneur of the 1990s - the owner of a pair of stalls in a raspberry jacket, with a "purse", on a used, but foreign car, imported from Kazakhstan - to compare with Yukos. Petty speculation and huge funds flowing abroad. (“Did Trotsky change fronts in 1925?”).

The largest and at the same time strange transaction was the agreement with the gold mining company Lena Goldfields. It was owned by a British banking consortium associated with the American banking house Kuhn Leeb. By the way, the infamous execution of Lena workers in 1912 was largely associated with the activities of Lena Goldfields.

The workers protested against exploitation by "domestic" and foreign capitalists, and most of the shares in the mines belonged to the owners of "Lena". And so, in September 1925, this company was given a concession to develop the Lena mines. The GKK was very generous - Western bankers received the territory stretching from Yakutia to the Ural Mountains. The company could mine, in addition to gold, also iron, copper, gold, lead. Many metallurgical enterprises were placed at its disposal - Bisertsky, Seversky, Revdinsky metallurgical plants, Zyuzelsky and Degtyarsky copper deposits, Revdinsky iron mines, etc. The share of the USSR in the extracted metals was only 7%.

Foreigners were given the go-ahead, and they began to manage - in the spirit of their "best" colonial traditions. “This foreign company, headed by the Englishman Herbert Guedal, behaved in the first socialist state in an extremely cheeky and impudent way,” notes N.V. Starikov. - At the conclusion of the concession agreement, she promised "investment", but did not invest a single ruble in the development of mines and enterprises. On the contrary, it came to the point that Lena Goldfields demanded state subsidies for itself and in every possible way evaded payment of all fees and taxes. ("Crisis: how it's done").

This continued until Trotsky was in the USSR - until 1929. The workers of the mines organized a series of strikes, and the Chekists simultaneously conducted a series of searches. After that, the company was deprived of the concession.

Criminal semi-capitalism

For the peasants, the NEP meant almost immediate relief. But for urban workers, even more difficult times have come. “... The workers suffered significantly from the transition to the market,” writes V.G. Sirotkin. - Previously, under "war communism", they were guaranteed a "party maximum" - some bread, cereals, meat, cigarettes, etc. - and everything is free, "distribution". Now the Bolsheviks offered to buy everything with money. But there was no real money, gold chervonets (they will appear only in 1924) - they were still replaced by "sovznaks". In October 1921, the bunglers from the Narkomfin printed so many of them that hyperinflation began - by May 1922 prices had increased 50 times! And no “pay” of the workers could keep up with them, although at that time the wage growth index was already introduced, taking into account the rise in prices. This is what caused the workers' strikes in 1922 (about 200 thousand people) and in 1923 (about 170 thousand). ("Why did Trotsky lose?").

On the other hand, a prosperous stratum of private entrepreneurs, the “Nepmen”, immediately arose. Not only did they manage to profit, they managed to enter into very profitable, and by no means always legal, connections with the administrative apparatus. This was facilitated by the decentralization of industry. Homogeneous and closely related enterprises were united in trusts (with only 40% being centrally subordinated, the rest were subordinated to local authorities). They were transferred to self-financing and provided greater independence. So, they themselves decided what to produce and where to sell their products. The enterprises of the trust had to do without state supplies, purchasing resources on the market. Now they were fully responsible for the results of their activities - they themselves used the proceeds from the sale of their products, but also covered their own losses.

It was then that the Nepachi speculators arrived in time, who tried in every possible way to "help" the management of the trusts. And from their trading and intermediary services, they had very solid profits. It is clear that the economic bureaucracy also fell under the influence of the "new" bourgeoisie - either due to inexperience, or for reasons of a "commercial" nature.

During the three years of the NEP, private traders controlled two-thirds of the entire wholesale and retail trade in the country.

Of course, all this was riddled with desperate corruption. Here are two examples of criminal semi-capitalism. In November 1922, the so-called. "Black Trust". It was created by the head of Mostabak A.V. Spiridonov and director of the Second State Tobacco Factory Ya.I. Circassian. The sale of tobacco products itself was to be carried out, first of all, to state institutions and cooperatives. However, this trust, which consisted of former tobacco wholesalers, received 90% of the total production of the tobacco factory. At the same time, they were provided with the best assortment, and even a 7–10-day loan.

In Petrograd, a private entrepreneur, metal merchant S. Plyatsky founded a supply and sales office, which had an annual turnover of three million rubles. As it turned out later, such solid incomes were possible as a result of close "cooperation" with 30 state institutions.

Researcher S.V. Bogdanov, referring to these and other facts of the “NEP” crime, notes: “Bribery among civil servants of the NEP period was a specific form of adaptation to the radically changed socio-economic realities of society. The salary of Soviet employees who were not included in the nomenclature lists was very low, and, from the point of view of social security, their position was unenviable. There were a lot of temptations to improve their financial situation through semi-legal deals with NEPmen. To this fact, it is necessary to add numerous reorganizations of the state administration apparatus, which were permanently going on throughout the entire period of the existence of the NEP and, of course, not only brought confusion, but also gave rise to the desire of individual officials to protect themselves in case of sudden dismissal. (“NEP: criminal entrepreneurship and power” // Rusarticles.Com).

Thus, the reforms led to the revival of the economy and the rise in living standards. However, it was very difficult and contradictory…

Special for the Centenary

NEP is an abbreviation made up of the first letters of the phrase "New Economic Policy". The NEP was introduced in Soviet Russia on March 14, 1921 by the decision of the Tenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks instead of politics.

"Shut up. And listen! - Izya said that he had just entered the printing house of the Odessa Provincial Committee and saw there ... (Izya choked with excitement) .. a set of a speech recently delivered by Lenin in Moscow on the new economic policy. A vague rumor about this speech had been wandering around Odessa for three days now. But no one really knew anything. “We must print this speech,” said Izya ... The operation of kidnapping the set was done quickly and silently. Together and imperceptibly, we carried out the heavy lead typed speech, put it on a cab and drove to our printing house. The set was placed in the car. The machine rumbled softly and rustled as it typed out the historic speech. We eagerly read it by the light of a kitchen kerosene lamp, agitated and realizing that history stands next to us in this dark printing house and we also participate in it to some extent ... And on the morning of April 16, 1921, the old Odessa newspaper sellers were skeptics, misanthropes and the sclerotics went hurriedly shuffling through the streets with pieces of wood and shouting in hoarse voices: “Morak newspaper!” Comrade Lenin's speech! Read everything! Only in Morak, you won't read it anywhere else! Morak Newspaper! The number of "Sailor" with a speech sold out in a few minutes. (K. Paustovsky "Time of great expectations")

Causes of the NEP

• From 1914 to 1921, the volume of gross output of Russian industry decreased by 7 times
• Stocks of raw materials and materials by 1920 were exhausted
• Marketability of agriculture fell by 2.5 times
• In 1920, traffic railways amounted to a fifth in relation to 1914.
• The area under crops, grain yields, and the production of livestock products have been reduced.
• Commodity-money relations were destroyed
• A "black market" was formed, speculation flourished
• The standard of living of workers has plummeted.
• As a result of the closure of many enterprises, the process of declassing the proletariat began.
• In the political sphere, the undivided dictatorship of the RCP (b) was established
• Workers' strikes, uprisings of peasants and sailors began

The essence of the NEP

• Revival of commodity-money relations
• Granting freedom of management to small commodity producers
• Replacing the surplus tax with a tax in kind, the size of the tax has almost halved compared to the surplus appraisal
• Creation of trusts in industry - associations of enterprises that themselves decided what to produce and where to sell products.
• Creation of syndicates - associations of trusts for the wholesale distribution of products, lending and regulation of trade operations in the market.
• Reduction of the bureaucracy
• Introduction of cost accounting
• Creation of the State Bank, savings banks
• Restoration of the system of direct and indirect taxes.
• Carrying out monetary reform

  “When I saw Moscow again, I was amazed: after all, I went abroad in the last weeks of war communism. Everything looked different now. The cards disappeared, people were no longer attached. The staff of various institutions was greatly reduced, and no one made grandiose projects ... Old workers, engineers with difficulty restored production. Goods have arrived. Peasants began to bring living creatures to the markets. Muscovites ate, cheered up. I remember how, having arrived in Moscow, I froze in front of a grocery store. What was not there! Most convincing was the sign: "Estomak" (stomach). The belly was not only rehabilitated, but exalted. In a cafe on the corner of Petrovka and Stoleshnikov, the inscription made me laugh: "Children visit us to eat cream." I did not find children, but there were many visitors, and it seemed that they were getting fat before our eyes. Many restaurants were opened: here is Prague, there is Hermitage, then Lisbon, Bar. On every corner there were noisy pubs - with a foxtrot, with a Russian choir, with gypsies, with balalaikas, just with scuffles. Reckless drivers stood near the restaurants, waiting for those who were on a spree, and, as in the distant times of my childhood, they said: “Your Excellency, I’ll give you a ride ...” Here you could see beggars, homeless people; they plaintively pulled: "Kopeck". There were no kopecks: there were millions (“lemons”) and brand new chervonets. Several million were lost overnight in the casino: the profits of brokers, speculators or ordinary thieves ”( I. Ehrenburg "People, years, life")

Results of the NEP

The success of the NEP was the restoration of the destroyed Russian economy and overcoming hunger

Legally, the new economic policy was curtailed on October 11, 1931 by a party resolution on the complete ban on private trade in the USSR. But in fact, it ended in 1928 with the adoption of the first five-year plan and the announcement of a course towards accelerated industrialization and collectivization of the USSR.

New economic policy- economic policy pursued in Soviet Russia and the USSR in the 1920s. It was adopted on March 15, 1921 by the X Congress of the RCP (b), replacing the policy of "war communism", which was carried out during the Civil War. The New Economic Policy was aimed at restoring the national economy and the subsequent transition to socialism. The main content of the NEP is the replacement of the surplus appropriation tax in the countryside (up to 70% of grain was confiscated during the surplus appraisal, and about 30% with the food tax), the use of the market and various forms of ownership, the attraction of foreign capital in the form of concessions, the implementation of the monetary reform (1922-1924), in as a result of which the ruble became a convertible currency.

Prerequisites for the transition to the NEP

After the end of the civil war, the country found itself in a difficult situation, faced a deep economic and political crisis. As a result of almost seven years of war, Russia has lost more than a quarter of its national wealth. The industry has been especially hard hit. The volume of its gross output decreased by 7 times. Stocks of raw materials and materials by 1920 were basically exhausted. Compared with 1913, the gross output of large-scale industry has decreased by almost 13%, and that of small-scale industry by more than 44%.

Huge destruction was inflicted on transport. In 1920, the volume of railway traffic was 20% compared to the pre-war level. The situation in agriculture worsened. The area under crops, productivity, gross harvest of grain, production of livestock products have decreased. Agriculture has become more and more consumerist, its marketability has fallen by 2.5 times. There was a sharp drop in the standard of living and labor of workers. As a result of the closure of many enterprises, the process of declassing the proletariat continued. Huge hardships led to the fact that from the autumn of 1920, discontent began to increase among the working class. The situation was complicated by the beginning of the demobilization of the Red Army. As the fronts of the civil war retreated to the borders of the country, the peasantry began to more and more actively oppose the surplus appraisal, which was implemented by violent methods with the help of food detachments.

The policy of "war communism" led to the destruction of commodity-money relations. The sale of food and industrial goods was limited, they were distributed by the state in the form of wages in kind. An equalizing system of wages among workers was introduced. This gave them the illusion of social equality. The failure of this policy was manifested in the formation of a "black market" and the flourishing of speculation. In the social sphere, the policy of “war communism” was based on the principle of “ Who does not work shall not eat". In 1918, labor service was introduced for representatives of the former exploiting classes, and in 1920 - universal labor service. Forced mobilization of labor resources was carried out with the help of labor armies sent to restore transport, construction work, etc. The naturalization of wages led to the free provision of housing, utilities, transport, postal and telegraph services. During the period of “war communism”, the undivided dictatorship of the RCP (b) was established in the political sphere, which also later was one of the reasons for the transition to the NEP. The Bolshevik Party ceased to be a purely political organization; its apparatus gradually merged with state structures. It determined the political, ideological, economic and cultural situation in the country, even the personal life of citizens. In essence, it was about the crisis of the policy of "war communism".

Devastation and famine, strikes of workers, uprisings of peasants and sailors - all testified that a deep economic and social crisis had ripened in the country. In addition, by the spring of 1921, the hope for an early world revolution and the material and technical assistance of the European proletariat had been exhausted. Therefore, V. I. Lenin revised his internal political course and recognized that only the satisfaction of the demands of the peasantry could save the power of the Bolsheviks.

The essence of the NEP

The essence of the NEP was not clear to everyone. Disbelief in the NEP, its socialist orientation gave rise to disputes about the ways of developing the country's economy, about the possibility of building socialism. With the most varied understanding of the NEP, many party leaders agreed that at the end of the civil war in Soviet Russia, two main classes of the population remained: workers and peasants, and at the beginning of the 20 years after the introduction of the NEP, a new bourgeoisie appeared, the bearer of restoration tendencies. A wide field of activity for the Nepman bourgeoisie was made up of industries serving the main and most important consumer interests of the city and countryside. V. I. Lenin understood the inevitable contradictions, the dangers of development on the path of the NEP. He considered it necessary to strengthen the Soviet state in order to ensure victory over capitalism.

In general, the NEP economy was a complex and unstable market-administrative structure. Moreover, the introduction of market elements into it was of a forced nature, while the preservation of administrative-command elements was fundamental and strategic. Without abandoning the ultimate goal (creation of a non-market economic system) of the NEP, the Bolsheviks resorted to using commodity-money relations while maintaining in the hands of the state "commanding heights": nationalized land and mineral resources, large and most of the medium industry, transport, banking, monopoly foreign trade. A relatively long coexistence of the socialist and non-socialist (state-capitalist, private capitalist, small-scale, patriarchal) structures was assumed with the gradual displacement of the latter from the economic life of the country, relying on "commanding heights" and using the levers of economic and administrative influence on large and small owners (taxes, loans , pricing policy, legislation, etc.).

From the point of view of V. I. Lenin, the essence of the NEP maneuver consisted in laying an economic foundation for the “alliance of the working class and the working peasantry”, in other words, granting a certain freedom of economic management that prevailed in the country among small commodity producers in order to remove their acute dissatisfaction with the authorities and ensure political stability in society. As the Bolshevik leader emphasized more than once, the NEP was a roundabout, indirect way to socialism, the only possible one after the failure of the attempt to directly and quickly break down all market structures. However, he did not reject the direct path to socialism in principle: Lenin recognized it as quite suitable for the developed capitalist states after the victory of the proletarian revolution there.

NEP in agriculture

The resolution of the 10th Congress of the RCP(b) on replacing the apportionment with the tax in kind, which marked the beginning of the new economic policy, was legally formalized by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in March 1921. The size of the tax was almost halved compared to the surplus, and its main burden fell on wealthy rural peasants. The decree limited the freedom of trade in the products remaining with the peasants after paying the tax "within the limits of local economic turnover." Already by 1922, there was a noticeable growth in agriculture. The country was fed. In 1925 the sown area reached the pre-war level. The peasants sowed almost the same area as in pre-war 1913. The gross grain harvest amounted to 82% compared with 1913. The number of livestock exceeded the pre-war level. 13 million farms were members of the agricultural cooperative. There were about 22,000 collective farms in the country. The implementation of grandiose industrialization required a radical restructuring of the agricultural sector. In Western countries, the agrarian revolution, i.e. the system of improving agricultural production preceded revolutionary industry, and therefore, on the whole, it was easier to supply the urban population with food. In the USSR, both of these processes had to be carried out simultaneously. At the same time, the village was considered not only as a source of food, but also as the most important channel for replenishing financial resources for the needs of industrialization.

NEP in industry

Radical transformations also took place in industry. Glavki were abolished, and trusts were created instead - associations of homogeneous or interconnected enterprises that received complete economic and financial independence, up to the right to issue long-term bonded loans. By the end of 1922, about 90% of industrial enterprises were united in 421 trusts, 40% of which were centralized, and 60% were local subordination. The trusts themselves decided what to produce and where to sell their products. The enterprises that were part of the trust were removed from the state supply and switched to purchasing resources on the market. The law provided that "the state treasury is not responsible for the debts of trusts."

The Supreme Council of National Economy, having lost the right to interfere in the current activities of enterprises and trusts, turned into a coordinating center. His apparatus was drastically reduced. It was at that time that economic accounting appeared, in which the enterprise (after mandatory fixed contributions to the state budget) has the right to manage the income from the sale of products, is itself responsible for the results of its economic activity, independently uses profits and covers losses. Under the NEP, Lenin wrote, "state enterprises are transferred to the so-called economic accounting, that is, in fact, to a large extent on commercial and capitalist principles."

The Soviet government tried to combine two principles in the activities of trusts - market and planning. Encouraging the former, the state strove, with the help of trusts, to borrow technology and methods of work from the market economy. At the same time, the principle of planning in the activities of trusts was strengthened. The state encouraged the spheres of activity of trusts and the creation of a system of concerns by joining trusts with enterprises producing raw materials and finished products. The concerns were to serve as centers for the planned management of the economy. For these reasons, in 1925, the motivation for “profit” as the purpose of their activities was removed from the provision on trusts and only the mention of “commercial calculation” was left. So, the trust as a form of management combined planned and market elements, which the state tried to use to build a socialist planned economy. This was the complexity and inconsistency of the situation.

Almost simultaneously, syndicates began to be created - associations of trusts for the wholesale sale of products, lending and regulation of trade operations in the market. By the end of 1922, the syndicates controlled 80% of the industry covered by the trusts. In practice, there are three types of syndicates:

1. with a predominance of the trading function (Textile, Wheat, Tobacco);
2. with a predominance of the regulatory function (Council of Congresses of the main chemical industry);
3. syndicates created by the state on a forced basis (Solesyndicat, Oil, Coal, etc.) to maintain control over the most important resources.

Thus, syndicates as a form of management also had a dual character: on the one hand, they combined elements of the market, as they were focused on improving the commercial activities of the trusts included in them, on the other hand, they were monopoly organizations in this industry, regulated by higher state bodies (VSNKh and people's commissariats).

Financial reform of the NEP

The transition to the NEP required the development of a new financial policy. Experienced pre-revolutionary financiers took part in the reform of the financial and monetary system: N. Kutler, V. Tarnovsky, professors L. Yurovsky, P. Genzel, A. Sokolov, Z. Katsenelenbaum, S. Volkner, N. Shaposhnikov, N. Nekrasov, A. Manuilov, former assistant minister A. Khrushchev. Great organizational work was carried out by People's Commissar for Finance G. Sokolnikov, member of the board of the People's Commissariat of Finance V. Vladimirov, Chairman of the Board of the State Bank A. Sheiman. The main directions of the reform were identified: the cessation of money emission, the establishment of a deficit-free budget, the restoration of the banking system and savings banks, the introduction of a single monetary system, the creation of a stable currency, and the development of an appropriate tax system.

By a decree of the Soviet government dated October 4, 1921, the State Bank was formed as part of the Narkomfin, savings and loan offices were opened, payment for transport, cash and telegraph services was introduced. The system of direct and indirect taxes was restored. To strengthen the budget, they sharply reduced all expenses that did not correspond to state revenues. Further normalization of the financial and banking system required the strengthening of the Soviet ruble.

In accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars, from November 1922, the issuance of a parallel Soviet currency, the "Chervonets", began. It was equated to 1 spool - 78.24 shares or 7.74234 g of pure gold, i.e. the amount that was contained in the pre-revolutionary golden ten. It was forbidden to pay off the budget deficit with chervonets. They were intended to serve the credit operations of the State Bank, industry, and wholesale trade.

To maintain the stability of the chervonets, the special part (SP) of the currency department of Narkomfin bought or sold gold, foreign currency and chervonets. Despite the fact that this measure was in the interests of the state, such commercial activities of the OCH were regarded by the OGPU as speculation, therefore, in May 1926, arrests and executions of the leaders and employees of the OCH began (L. Volin, A.M. Chepelevsky and others, who were only rehabilitated 1996).

The high nominal value of chervonets (10, 25, 50 and 100 rubles) created difficulties with their exchange. In February 1924, a decision was made to issue state treasury notes in denominations of 1, 3, and 5 rubles. gold, as well as small changeable silver and copper coins.

In 1923 and 1924 two devaluations of the soviet mark (the former settlement banknote) were carried out. This gave the monetary reform a confiscatory character. On March 7, 1924, a decision was made to issue state marks by the State Bank. For every 500 million rubles handed over to the state. sample 1923, their owner received 1 kopeck. So the system of two parallel currencies was liquidated.

In general, the state has achieved some success in carrying out monetary reform. Chervonets began to be produced by stock exchanges in Constantinople, the Baltic countries (Riga, Revel), Rome, and some eastern countries. The course of the chervonets was equal to 5 dollars. 14 US cents.

The strengthening of the country's financial system was facilitated by the revival of the credit and tax systems, the creation of stock exchanges and a network of joint-stock banks, the spread of commercial credit, and the development of foreign trade.

However, the financial system created on the basis of the NEP began to destabilize in the second half of the 1920s. due to several reasons. The state strengthened the planning principles in the economy. The control figures for the financial year 1925-26 affirmed the idea of ​​maintaining money circulation by increasing emission. By December 1925, the money supply had increased by 1.5 times compared to 1924. This led to an imbalance between the volume of trade and money supply. Since the State Bank constantly introduced gold and foreign currency into circulation in order to withdraw cash surpluses and maintain the exchange rate of the gold coin, the state's foreign exchange reserves were soon depleted. The fight against inflation was lost. From July 1926, it was forbidden to export chervonets abroad and the purchase of chervonets on the foreign market was stopped. Chervonets from a convertible currency turned into the internal currency of the USSR.

Thus, the monetary reform of 1922-1924. was a comprehensive reform of the sphere of circulation. monetary system rebuilt simultaneously with the establishment of wholesale and retail trade, the elimination of the budget deficit, the revision of prices. All these measures helped restore and streamline monetary circulation, overcome emission, and ensure the formation of a solid budget. At the same time, financial and economic reform helped streamline taxation. A hard currency and a solid state budget were the most important achievements of the financial policy of the Soviet state in those years. In general, the monetary reform and financial recovery contributed to the restructuring of the mechanism of operation of the entire national economy on the basis of the NEP.

The role of the private sector during the NEP

During the NEP period, a major role in the restoration of light and Food Industry the private sector played - it produced up to 20% of all industrial output (1923) and prevailed in wholesale (15%) and retail (83%) trade.

Private industry took the form of handicraft, rental, joint-stock and cooperative enterprises. Private entrepreneurship has become notable in the food, clothing, and leather industries, as well as in the oil-pressing, flour-grinding, and shag industries. About 70% of private enterprises were located on the territory of the RSFSR. In total in 1924-1925. in the USSR there were 325 thousand private enterprises. They employed about 12% of the entire workforce, with an average of 2-3 employees per enterprise. Private enterprises produced about 5% of all industrial output (1923). the state constantly restricted the activities of private entrepreneurs by using the tax press, depriving entrepreneurs of voting rights, etc.

At the end of the 20s. in connection with the curtailment of the NEP, the policy of restricting the private sector was replaced by a course towards its elimination.

Consequences of the NEP

In the second half of the 1920s, the first attempts to curtail the NEP began. Syndicates in industry were liquidated, from which private capital was administratively ousted, and a rigid centralized system of economic management (economic people's commissariats) was created.

In October 1928, the implementation of the first five-year plan for the development of the national economy began, the country's leadership set a course for accelerated industrialization and collectivization. Although no one officially canceled the NEP, by that time it had already been actually curtailed.

Legally, the NEP was terminated only on October 11, 1931, when a resolution was adopted on the complete ban on private trade in the USSR.

The undoubted success of the NEP was the restoration of the destroyed economy, and, given that after the revolution, Russia lost highly qualified personnel (economists, managers, production workers), the success of the new government becomes a "victory over devastation." At the same time, the lack of those same highly qualified personnel has become the cause of miscalculations and errors.

Significant economic growth rates, however, were achieved only due to the return to operation of pre-war capacities, because Russia only by 1926-1927 reached economic indicators pre-war years. The potential for further economic growth turned out to be extremely low. The private sector was not allowed to "command heights in the economy", foreign investment was not welcomed, and investors themselves were not particularly in a hurry to Russia because of the ongoing instability and the threat of nationalization of capital. The state, on the other hand, was unable to make long-term capital-intensive investments only from its own funds.

The situation in the countryside was also contradictory, where the "kulaks" were clearly oppressed.

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(NEP) - carried out in the period from 1921 to 1924. in Soviet Russia, the economic policy that replaced the policy of "war communism".

The crisis of the Bolshevik policy of "war communism" manifested itself most acutely in the economy. Most of the food, metal and fuel supplies went to the needs of the civil war. Industry also worked for military needs, as a result, agriculture was supplied with 2-3 times fewer machines and tools than required. The lack of workers, agricultural equipment and seed fund led to a reduction in the area under crops, the gross harvest of agricultural products decreased by 45%. All this caused a famine in 1921, as a result of which almost 5 million people died.

The deterioration of the economic situation, the preservation of emergency communist measures (surplus appropriation) led to the emergence in 1921 of an acute political and economic crisis in the country. The result was anti-Bolshevik protests by peasants, workers, and the military demanding the political equality of all citizens, freedom of speech, the establishment of workers' control over production, the encouragement of private enterprise, etc.

In order to normalize the economy, destroyed by the Civil War, intervention and measures of "war communism", and to stabilize the socio-political sphere, the Soviet government decided to make a temporary retreat from its principles. The policy of a temporary transition to a capitalist economy with the aim of raising the economy and settling social and political problems was called the NEP (New Economic Policy).

The departure from the NEP was facilitated by such factors as the weakness of domestic private enterprise, which was the result of its long-term prohibition and excessive state intervention. Unfavorable global economic background ( economic crisis in the West in 1929) was interpreted as the "decay" of capitalism. The economic rise of Soviet industry by the mid-1920s. was hampered by the lack of new reforms needed to maintain growth rates (for example, the creation of new industries, the weakening of state control, the revision of taxes).

In the late 1920s reserves dried up, the country was faced with the need for huge investments in agriculture and industry for the reconstruction and modernization of enterprises. Due to the lack of funds for the development of industry, the city could not meet the rural demand for urban goods. They tried to save the situation by raising prices for manufactured goods ("commodity famine" of 1924), which led to the loss of the peasantry's interest in selling food to the state or its unprofitable exchange for manufactured goods. Decreased production volumes, in 1927-1929. aggravated the crisis of grain procurements. The printing of new money, the rise in the cost of agricultural and industrial products led to the depreciation of the chervonets. In the summer of 1926, the Soviet currency ceased to be convertible (transactions with it abroad were terminated after the gold standard was abandoned).

Faced with a lack of public financial resources on the development of industry, from the mid-1920s. all NEP activities were curtailed with the aim of greater centralization of the financial and material resources available in the country, and by the end of the 1920s. the country followed the path of planned and directive development of industrialization and collectivization.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources